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Abstract
T h e present study examines • range of moral issues associated with recent cyberstalking cases. Particular attention is centered on the A m y Boyer/Liam Youens case of
cyberstalking, which raises a host of considerations that
we believe have a significant impact for ethical behavior
on the Internet. A m o n g the questions we consider are
those having to do with personal privacy and the use of
certain kinds of Internet search facilities to stalk individuals in cyberspace. Also considered are questions having to do with legal liability and (possible) moral responsibility that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have
for stalking crimes that occur in their %pace" on the
Internet. Finall~ we examine issues of moral responsibility for individual online users to determine which obligations, if any, they might have to inform persons who
are targeted by cyberstalkers, when it is in their power
tO

do so.

Keywords
Cyberstalking, personal privacy, search engines, ISPs,
moral responsibility, and duty to assist
1. INTRODUCTION: STALKING ACTIVITIES
IN CYBERSPACE
W h a t exactly is c y b e r s t a l k i n g , and h o w exactly do
stalking incidents in cyberspace raise concerns for ethics? I n a n s w e r i n g these q u e s t i o n s , we begin w i t h a
definition of stalking in general. According to Webster's
New World Dictionary of the American Language, one
definition of stalking is ~to pursue or approach game,
an enemy, etc. stealthily, as f r o m cover." In an ext e n d e d sense o f stalking, as applied to c r i m i n a l activities involving h u m a n beings, a "stalking activity"
22
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has c o m e to be associated w i t h one i n d i v i d u a l ("the
stalker ~) c l a n d e s t i n e l y t r a c k i n g t h e m o v e m e n t a n d
w h e r e a b o u t s of an a n o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l or individuals
("the stalkee[s]~).
Cyberstalking can be u n d e r s t o o d as a f o r m of behavior in w h i c h certain types o f stalking-related activities, which in the past have occurred in physical space,
are extended to the online world. O n the one hand,
we do n o t wish to claim that cyberstalking is a new
kind of crime or that it is a "genuine c o m p u t e r crime"
(see Tavani, 2 0 0 0 ) . O n the o t h e r h a n d , we believe
t h a t the I n t e r n e t has m a d e a relevant difference because of the way stalking activities can n o w be carried
out (see Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2001). For example,
I n t e r n e t s t a l k e r s can o p e r a t e a n o n y m o u s l y or
p s e u d o n o n y m o u s l y w h i l e o n l i n e . In a d d i t i o n , a
cyberstalker can stalk one or m o r e individuals f r o m
the c o m f o r t of his living room, and thus n o t have to
v e n t u r e out into the physical world to carry o u t his
task. So I n t e r n e t t e c h n o l o g y has m a d e possible certain modes of stalking that w o u l d not have been possible in the p r e - I n t e r n e t era.
M a n y people are c o n c e r n e d a b o u t the k i n d and the
n u m b e r of stalking-related activities that n o w occur
in cyberspace. T h e r e are m a n y reasons w h y these individuals w o u l d seem justified in their concern. Because stalking crimes are n o t fully understood in terms
of their conceptual boundaries and their implications,
it is t h a t m u c h m o r e difficult to u n d e r s t a n d clearly
w h a t it w o u l d m e a n to stalk s o m e o n e in cyberspace.
In the cyber-realm, for example, there are no physical-space criteria that are strictly analogous to those
in physical space.
O n e difficulty in u n d e r s t a n d i n g some of the essential
features of cyberstalking crimes is that these crimes
sometimes border on, and thus become confused with,
broader forms of "harassment crimes." Consider a rec e n t i n c i d e n t i n v o l v i n g t w e n t y - y e a r old C h r i s t i a n
H u n o l d , w h o was charged w i t h terrorizing T i m o t h y

McGillicuddy, principal of a high school in the US.
Hunold constructed a Web site that included "hit lists"
of teachers and students at the school, and a picture
of the school that was displayed t h r o u g h "the cross
hairs of a rifle". O n that site, Hunold, under various
pseudonyms, corresponded with 40 of the 215 eighth
graders in the school. He then began to make threats
to the victims in Massachusetts who did not k n o w
that they were actually dealing with a person who
lived in Missouri ("The Web's Dark Side ~, 2000). Is
this behavior a form of cyberstalking or is it ~harassm e n t in cyberspace?"
T h e case of Randi Barber and Gary Dellapenta illustrates an i n c i d e n t in w h i c h the stalker h i m s e l f engaged others to stalk the intended victim in physical
space. In 1996, Barber met Dellapenta, a security
guard, through a friend. Although Dellapenta wanted
a relationship with Barber, she spurned his advances.
A few m o n t h s later, Barber began to receive p h o n e
solicitations f r o m m e n on her telephone answering
machine; and in one case, a "solicitor ~ actually appeared at the door of her residence. Because she had
never used a c o m p u t e r or had never interacted with
the Internet, Barber had no idea how potentially dangerous her situation was. For example, Barber was
not aware that Dellapenta had actually assumed her
identity in various Internet chat rooms, when soliciting "kinky sex". A n o n y m i t y and pseudonymity tools,
available to any Internet user, allowed Dellapenta to
represent himself as Barber, via screen names such as
a "playfulkitty4U" and "kinkygal30". His access to
chat rooms and message boards enabled him to disseminate information about Barber to Internet users
around the globe. Barber became aware of what was
going on only after she asked one caller why he was
p h o n i n g her. T h e caller's answer both shocked and
frightened her. Barber's anonymous cyberstalker had
managed to unleash a chain of threatening events with
a few clicks of a mouse (Foote, 1999). Again, we can
ask w h e t h e r the B a r b e r / D e l l a p e n t a case is t r u l y
cyberstalking instead of a m o r e general instance of
h ar a s s m en t
Thus far we have described some particular cases that
have been described as cyberstalking activities. We
have also seen why, in these particular cases, it was
difficult to separate out certain harassment activities
(in general) from stalking behavior in particular. In
the next section we focus our attention on a specific
case of Internet stalking involving Amy Boyer. We will

see why this particular case would seem to be a clear
instance of cyberstalking. We will also see why the
Amy Boyer case raises a range of ethical issues that are
philosophically interesting.

2. THE AMY BOYER CASE: SOME ETHICAL
IMPLICATIONS
O n October 15, 1999, A m y Boyer, a twenty-year-old
resident of Nashua, NH, was murdered by a young man
who had stalked her via the Internet. The stalker, Liam
Youens, was able to carry out most of the stalking activities that eventually led to Boyer's death by using a variety of tools available to him online. Through the use of
standard Internet search facilities, for example, Youens
gathered information about Boyer that was readily accessible from databases available to online search requests.
A series of Internet searches on the name "Amy Boyer"
yielded several pieces of information about Boyer, which
Youens could then piece together to track down his victim. Through the use of certain tools available to any
Internet user, he was able to find out where Boyer lived,
where she worked, what kind of vehicle she drove, etc. In
addition to using Internet search-related tools to acquire
personal information about Boyer, Youens was also able
to use other kinds of online tools, provided by Internet
Service Providers (ISPs), to construct two Web sites. O n
one site, he posted personal information about Boyer,
including her picture, and on another the other site he
described, in explicit detail, his plans to murder Boyer.
The Amy Boyer case has raised a number of controversial
questions, many of which would seem to have significant
moral implications for cyberspace. One question at issue
here is whether there really is anything special about
Boyer's murder, including the stalking activities that led
to her eventual death. In response to the Boyer inddent,
philosophers taking a position that Deborah Johnson
(2001) describes as the ~traditionalist" view might argue
that there is nothing philosophically or morally interesting about cyberstalking in general, or the Amy Boyer
case in particular. A traditionalist would point out, for
example, that ~murder is murder," and that, unfortunately, several homicides occur each day. O n this view,
whether a murderer uses a computing device that induded Internet tools to assist in carrying out a particular
murder would seem irrelevant; or at least it would not
intuitively seem to be a factor that makes a qualitative
difference in the carrying out of a crime such as homicide. A traditionalist might also take the position that
there is nothing special about cyberstalking incidents in
C o m p u t e r s and Society, March 2002
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general - - irrespective of whether or not those incidents
result in the death of the victims - - since stalking activities have had a long history of occurrence in the "offline" world. O n this view, the use of Internet technology
could be seen as simply the latest in a series of tools or
techniques that have become available to stalkers to assist them in carrying out their criminal activities.
Those philosophers who could be described as "uniqueness advocates" (see Tavani, 2001) with respect to computer ethics issues, on the other hand, would likely suggest that there are certain aspects of cyberstalking that
raise either new or special ethical problems. Proponents
of this view can point to a number of factors which, either individually or in combination, would support such
a position. For one thing, they can point out the relative
ease with which stalking activities can n o w be carried
out in cyberspace. By simply using a computing device
with Internet access, one can now stalk a targeted victim
without having to leave the comfort of his or her home.
Uniqueness advocates could then go on to point to issues
having to do with the scope of stalking crimes that are
now possible. T h r o u g h the use of Internet technology,
for example, an individual can stalk multiple victims simultaneously through the use of multiple "windows~ on
his computer. The stalker can also stalk victims who happen to live in states and countries that are geographically
distant from the stalker. Also, through the use of Internet
technology a stalker can, as Liam Youens did, easily acquire personal information about his or her victim because of the availability of such information that is readily
accessible from electronic databases via online search engines.
Uniqueness advocates can also point to issues having to
do with the aspects o f stalking having to do with the
scale or number of stalking crimes now made possible by
cyber-technology. For example, a stalker can roam the
Internet anonymously, or under a certain alias (pseudonym), which makes it m u c h more difficult for law-enforcement agents to track down that stalker, either before or after the stalker has caused physical harm to his
victim. Because of the ease of electronic stalking, individuals who might never have considered stalking a victim in physical space might be tempted to engage in one
or m o r e stalking activities in virtual space. These and
other factors, it could be further argued, contribute to
the possibility of stalking crimes occurring on a scale that
would not likdy have been possible prior to the advent
of the Internet. It has also been argued that cyberstalking
activities have significant implications for a range of ethi24
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cal and social issues, ranging from those of privacy and
securit)~ free speech and censorship to more general questions involving moral responsibility and legal liability
(see Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2001).
As mentioned above, our specific concern in this section
of the paper is with the stalking incident involving Amy
Boyer and with particular ethical questions that the case
raises. For example, was Boyer's right to (or at least her
expectations about) privacy violated because of the personal information about her that was made available so
easily to Internet users such as Liana Youens? Did Youens
have a "right" to set up a dedicated Web site about A m y
Boyer without Boyer's knowledge and express consent;
and did Youens have a right to post on that Web site any
kind of information about Boyer - - regardless of whether
that information about her was psychologically harmful,
offensive, or defamatory? If so, is such a right one that is
- - or ought to be - - protected by free speech? Should
the two ISPs that enabled Youens to post such information to Web sites that reside in their Internet "space" be
held legally liable, especially when information contained
on those sites can easily lead to s o m e o n e ' s being physically harmed or, as in the case o f A m y Boyer, murdered?
F u r t h e r m o r e , do ordinary users who happen to come
across a Web site that contains a posting of a death threat
directed at an individual or group of individuals have a
moral responsibility to inform those individuals whose
lives are threatened? These kinds of questions are among
those which suggest that there may indeed be something
special a b o u t t h e A m y Boyer case (as well as for
cyberstalking activities in general) that are worthy o f further examination from a moral point of analysis.
Although each of the issues briefly described in the preceding paragraph have significant ethical implications,
and while each might deserve deeper philosophical analysis, we will limit our discussion in this section o f our
paper to three ethical concerns involving the A m y Boyer
case. First, we consider the issue of threats posed to potential cyberstalking victims because of the unrestricted
use of Internet search engines. We then consider questions o f legal liability a n d m o r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y in
cyberstalking incidents for I n t e r n e t Service Providers
(ISPs). Finally, we consider the role of individual moral
responsibility for Internet users who find themselves in a
position to inform a fellow user that she is being stalked.

3. INTERNET SEARCH ENGINES AND PUBLIC
RECORDS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSONAL
PRIVACY

limits on the ways in which electronic records containing confidential or intimate data can be exchanged. However, these laws and policies typically apply only to the
exchange of dectronic information such as that contained
in medical records and financial records. Helen
Nissenbaum (1998) has pointed out that such protection does not apply to personal information in the public sphere or in what she describes as "spheres other than
the intimate." Unfortunately for Amy Boyer, the kind of
information that was gathered about her by Youens would
be considered non-intimate and non-confidential in nature and thus would likely be viewed, by default, as "public ~ in nature. Is this presumption about how personal
information involving public records is currently viewed
one that it is either reasonable or fair? Was it fair to Amy
Boyer?

Few would dispute the value that Internet search engines have provided in directing us to a host of available
online resources, which in turn have aided us locating
useful information involving academic research, commerce, recreation, and so forth. Hence, some might be
surprised to find that search-engine technology itself
could be controversial in some way. However, search engines can also be used to locate personal information
about individuals. Sometimes that personal information
resides in the form of public records that are available to
Internet users, as in the case of information acquired about
A m y Boyer by Liam Youens. Other types of personal
information about individuals can also be acquired easily
because of certain kinds of personal data that has been What exactly should the status of personal information
made accessible to Internet search engines without the that resides in public records that now are accessible to
knowledge and consent of the person or persons affected. everyone be with respect to privacy policies and laws? In
But one might still ask why exactly the use of search- particular, what should the privacy status of this kind of
engine technology is controversial with respect to the information be in the Internet age? It could be noted
privacy of individuals. Because an individual may be that in the era preceding the Internet, information of
unaware that his or her name is among those included in this particular kind could have been acquired by indione or more databases accessible to search engines, indi- viduals willing to go to certain municipal buildings to
viduals have little control over h o w information about request hardcopy versions of public records that contained
them can be made available and be disseminated across personal information about various individuals. O f course,
the Internet (see Tavani, 1997). This was certainly the individuals requesting such information would have had
case in the incident involving A m y Boyer, who had no to physically travel to the municipal building where the
knowledge about or control over the ways in which cer- information they desired was housed, and those inditain kinds of personal information about her was acces- viduals would have probably been charged a small fee for
sible to Youens through Internet search engines - - for any records they obtained. If this kind of information
Boyer neither placed any personal information about about persons was already public before the advent of
herself on the Internet, nor was she aware that such in- cyber-technology, why should ira status necessarily change
formation about her had been so placed.
because of the new technology? Perhaps an equally important question that could be asked as an alternative to
It could be argued that all information currently avail- the original question is: W h y were such records made
able on the Internet, including information about indi- public in the first place? For example, were they made
vidual persons such as A m y Boyer, is, by virtue of the public so that online entrepreneurs like Docusearch.com
fact that it resides on the Internet, public information. could collect this information, combine it with other kinds
We can, of course, question whether all of the informa- of personal information, and then sell it for a profit? O f
tion currently available on the Internet should be viewed course, it could be argued that entrepreneurs who were
as public information. And, if the answer to that ques- so motivated could have engaged in this a c t i v i t y - and
tion is "yes," then should certain kinds of "public infor- some, no doubt, did - - in the era preceding the Internet.
mation," viz., public records that contain personal infor- But we could respond by asking how profitable and how
mation, be treated merely as public data or as data that practical would such an enterprise have been?
might deserve some kind of normative protection?
First, consider that "information merchants ~ would have
Because of concerns related to the easy flow of personal had to purchase the physical records (that were publicly
information between and across databases, certain laws available). These merchants would then have had to hire
have been enacted and some policies established to set legions of clerks to convert the purchased data into decComputers and Society, March 2002
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tronic form, sort the data according to some scheme, and
finally prepare it for sale. This process, in addition to
being highly impractical in terms of certain physical requirements, would hardly have been a profitable venture
given the amount of labor and cost involved. So, most
likely, it would not have occurred to entrepreneurs to
engage in such a business venture prior to the advent of
sophisticated i n f o r m a t i o n technology. But again, we
should ask why public records, including records that
contained personal information about individuals, were
made ~public ~ in the first place.
In order for governmental agencies at the local, state,
and federal levels to operate efficiently, records of certain
kinds of personal information were needed to be readily
available for access. For example, municipal governments
needed certain information for tax-assessment purposes,
such as assessing tax rates for houses and commercial real
estate. State g o v e r n m e n t s n e e d e d i n f o r m a t i o n about
motor vehicles registered in a particular state as well as
information about the residents of that state that are licensed to drive those vehicles. And federal governments
needed relevant information as well. Those records had
to be accessible to governmental agencies at various levels and had to be able to be transferred and exchanged
relatively easily. Since the records in question contained
personal information that was generally considered to be
neither confidential nor intimate, there were good reasons to declare them ~public records." It was assumed
that no harm could come to individuals because of the
availability of those public records, and it was believed
that communities would be better served because of the
access and flow of those records for purposes that seemed
to be legitimate. But certain factors have changed significantly. Information-gathering companies now access
those public records, manipulate the records in certain
ways, and then sell that information to third parties. Was
this the original intent for making such information accessible to the public?
It is perhaps interesting to note that there is now an
assumption on the part of some in the commercial sector
that because certain records are public, and because the
Internet is a public space, all public recorek ought to be made
available online. According to this line of reasoning, it is
not only desirable (for those entrepreneurs) that m a n y
records have, as a matter of fact, been electronically converted and placed online, but rather that there is also
some kind of legal mandate to place all public records
online. O n e presumption here might be based on our
alleged right to know what the government is up to (based
26
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on the notion of freedom of information) or to ensure
that public information flows freely. However, there have
now been several cases in which operating on such a presumption has caused outrage on the part of m a n y citizens, as well as harm to some, which in the case of Amy
Boyer resulted in death. So perhaps we should rethink
our criteria for what can count as "public records" and
for which kinds of personal information should be made
publicly available. We should also perhaps develop specific policies regarding the use o f search engines with
respect to which kinds of personal information should
be made available to them.
If Youens had to track down Amy Boyer without the aid
of Internet search facilities, would it have made a difference? Would he have gone to the relevant municipal
building to acquire information about Boyer (or would
he possibly have hired a private detective to do so)? If
Youcns himself had gone to the m u n i c i p a l building,
would it have been possible that someone, for example a
clerk in one of the offices, might have noticed that Youens
was behaving strangdy? If so, would such an observation
have prompted the clerk to notify his or her supervisor or
possibly even the police? And would such an action, in
turn, possibly have hdped to avoid the tragic outcome of
the Boyer case? O f course, these kinds of questions are
each speculative in nature. And because we are focusing
here on the Boyer incident, it is difficult to say what the
answers to these questions would mean in a broader sense
with regard to cyberstalking and to the easy access of
public records. But these questions do give us some pause,
and they may force us to reconsider our current beliefs
about the public vs. private realm of personal information. These questions also cause us to consider the need
for implementing explicit policies with regard to use of
Internet search engines in the retrieval of personal information. It is in these senses, then, that the A m y Boyer
incident raises for us some more general concerns about
personal privacy on the Internet, especially in light of
the absence of an explicit policy regarding online search
facilities and personal information.
So what can we conclude so far with respect to A m y
Boyer's rights and expectations regarding privacy? Was
her privacy violated; and if so, in what sense? Amy Boyer's
stepfather, Tim Remsberg, believes that his stepdaughter's
privacy was indeed violated. He has appeared before congressional groups and has influenced those in congress to
sponsor legislation that would make it illegal to sell the
social security numbers of one or mote individuals as a
part of online commercial transactions. Remsberg has

also sued Docusearch.com, the online company that provided Youens with information about where Boyer lived
and worked. Additionally, Remsberg has filed a wrongful death suit against Tripod and Geocities, the two ISPs
that hosted the Web sites that Youens set up about Boyer.
This brings us to our second principal ethical question
for consideration in the Boyer case, viz., whether ISPs
should be held morally responsible for the h a r m (psychological as well as physical) that results from the content included on certain Web sites that they happen to
host.

4.
INTERNET
SERVICE
PROVIDERS:
QUESTIONS OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
LEGAL LIABILITY
As noted earlier, Youens set up two Web sites about Amy
Boyer: one containing descriptive information about
Boyer, as well as a picture of her, and another on which
he described in detail his plans to murder Boyer. To what
extent, if any, either legally or morally or both, should
the ISPs that hosted the Web sites created by Youens be
held responsible? This question is one which is very complicated and which would benefit from being broken
down into several shorter questions. To answer the larger
question at issue, for example, we first need to understand what is meant by "responsibility" in both its legal
and moral senses. We also have to consider whether we
can attribute moral blame (or praise) to an organization
or collectivity (of individuals), such as an ISP. We begin
with a brief description of some current thinking on the
role of responsibility involving ISPs, including a brief
analysis of recent laws as well as some recent court challenges to those laws.
Deborah Johnson (2001) provides an excellent overview
of background issues involving questions of accountability and responsibility as they pertain to ISPs. So there is
no need for us to repeat that discussion here. We will
however, comment on certain points, elaborated upon in
much more detail in Johnson's exposition, which are especially relevant to our analysis of the Amy Boyer case.
In the 1995 case of Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services
Company, a court found that Prodigy could be held legally liable since it had advertised that it had *'editorial
control" over the computer bulletin board system (BBS)
it hosted. In the eyes of the court, Prodigy's claim to
have editorial control over its BBS made that ISP seem
m u c h like a newspaper, in which case the standard of
strict legal liability used for original publishers could be
applied. In light of the case involving Prodig~ many ISPs

have since argued that they should not be understood as
"original publishers," but rather as ~common carriers,"
similar in relevant respects to telephone companies. Their
argument for this view rested in part on the notion that
ISPs provide the "conduits for communication but not
the content." This view of ISPs would be used in later
court decisions.
In Section 230 of the C o m m u n i c a t i o n s Decency Act
(CDA), the role of ISPs was interpreted in such a way
that would appear to protect ISPs from lawsuits similar
to the one filed against Prodigy. Here the court specifically stated, ~No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker
of any information provided by another information content provider." Although CDA was overturned by a court
in Philadelphia, and was eventually struck down by the
US Supreme Court, Section 230 of that A C T has remained in tact. (Some have since referred to this policy
as the "Good Samaritan immunity for ISPs. ~) While ISPs
are not legally liable for the content of their Web sites or
for the content of other electronic forums that they also
might host - - e.g., forums such as bulletin boards and
list servers - - they have nonetheless been encouraged to
monitor and filter, to the extent that they can, the content of these sites and their electronic forums.
In the preceding paragraph we focused primarily on the
legal aspect of responsibility or accountability of ISPs,
with particular attention to strict liability laws. We saw
that from a legal point of view, ISPs are currently immune from prosecution for the content that can be included on the Web sites and in the other electronic forums that they host. However, we have not yet considered whether ISPs might be held morally accountability,
irrespective of the recent court rulings on the legal status
of this matter. Deborah Johnson (2001) has noted that
while it might be easier to make a utilitarian case for why
ISPs could be held legally liable for certain content, it
would be much more difficult to make the case that ISPs
should be morally responsible for the behavior of their
customers. Anton Vedder (2001) has recently advanced
an argument for why we should consider holding ISPs
morally responsible, as well as legally liable, for h a r m
caused to individuals.
Although we will not do justice to Vedder's argument in
the space provided to it in this paper, we will attempt to
reconstruct certain aspects of his overall argument in a
way that reveals certain controversial points that are salient in the Boyer case. Essentially, Vedder argues that in
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order to understand more clearly the issues at stake in
this dispute over ISP responsibility, we have to distinguish between two senses of moral responsibility: prospective and retrospective responsibility. While the latter
sense of responsibility is one that is often viewed as "backward looking," the former is sometimes described as "forward looking." Vedder admits, however, that this distinction is not always as clear and unambiguous as its
proponents suggest. For example, Vedder points out that
it is difficult to hold someone responsible for an act X in
a retrospective sense if that person were not also responsible for act X in some prospective sense as well. N o n e theless, Vedder believes that this distinction is useful in
helping us to understand the relevant aspects of moral
responsibility necessary to frame an argument in which
moral responsibility for h a r m can plausibly be said to
apply to ISPs. But how exactly does Vedder propose that
such an argument be constructed?
In the case of ISPs, the threat of legal liability can - despite the fact that currently in the US it is not - - be
used to deter ISPs from becoming lax about "policing"
their electronic forums to some reasonable extent. For
example, the threat of some form of legal liability might
cause ISPs to monitor or filter their sites on a regular
basis to discover controversial sites and to remove them.
So underlying the reasoning for the application of liability in a legal sense to ISPs is the utilitarian notion of
deterring harm to individuals in the future, a notion of
responsibility that is also prospective in nature. But Vedder
notes that we are hesitant to attribute a retrospective sense
of responsibility to ISPs when evaluating their moral culpability because that sense of responsibility also implies
guilt and because the notion of guilt is usually attributed
to individuals and not to organizations. (Guilt, as Vedder
also notes, is more often associated with Kantian theories
than with utilitarian theories.) Vedder then suggests that
in some cases it would also make sense to attribute the
notion of guilt to a collectivity (i.e., a collection of individuals) like an ISP, as well as to individuals. This form of
attribution o f moral responsibility in the retrospective
sense to an ISP would also make sense, from Vedder's
view, because of the connection Vedder draws (as we discussed above) between retrospective and prospective responsibility. If we reconstruct Vedder's argument, the
reasoning would proceed along lines similar to the following: If collectivities (such as ISPs) can be held responsible in a prospective sense (which is the rationale at the
basis for legal liability for ISPs), and if it makes no sense
to hold an agent responsible for an act in a retrospective
sense if he/she is not responsible for that act in a pro28
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spective sense as wall (as Vedder separately argues), then
we could conclude that it is reasonable to ascribe retrospective responsibility in a moral sense to ISPs. O f course,
Vedder's argument is far more complex and much more
subtle with respect to important details than in the summary account of it that we have reconstructed here.
Let us next consider how we might apply Vedder's argum e n t to the case involving A m y Boyer. Should Tripod
and Geocities, the two ISPs that enabled Lia_m Youens to
set up his Web sites about A m y Boyer, be held morally
responsible for the h a r m to Amy Boyer that resulted
in her death? And should those two ISPs be held morally
responsible, even if no legal charges (e.g., in terms o f
strict legal liability) can be brought against them? O f
course, we could ask what would be the purpose of attributing moral responsibility to these two ISPs, if there
were no "teeth" in the form of legal sanctions that could
subsequently be enforced. One answer to this question,
though admittedly an answer that might seem to some
as one that is trivial or pointless from the vantage-point
of law enforcement, is that doing so might cause us not
only to distinguish moral from legal considerations in
our thinking but could also cause us to think about moral
responsibility, both at the individual and collective levels, independent of the presence or absence of particular
laws that might or might not apply in a specific case. For
example, we can consider whether Tripod and Geocities
should be excused from any sense of moral responsibility
in the A m y Boyer case simply because these two ISPs
cannot be f o u n d legally lizble and thus prosecuted on
legal grounds.
We will also consider in the following section of this essay a variation of the question raised in the preceding
paragraph. There, for example, we will consider whether
we should automatically excuse ourselves as individuals
from being morally responsible in a particular situation
simply because there is an absence of a specific law obligating us to perform a certain action in that situation.
Even if, as individuals, we would have had no legal obligation to inform A m y Boyer that a death threat involving her had been posted on the Web, does it follow that
we also would have no moral responsibility to do so if we
had the ability to do so?
So if Vedder is correct, it would seem to follow that aspects of moral and legal responsibility might not be able
to be separated as ~cleanly" as m a n y philosophers and
legal scholars have suggested. While Gcocities and Tripod might both be found not to be legally liable for the

harm caused to A m y Boyer, and even though these two
ISPs did not deliberately cause her harm, it is not clear
that we can conclude that both ISPs should not be held
morally responsible in some sense for the harm that resulted to A m y Boyer. It would be plausible to assume,
then, that: If Tripod and Geocities could be held legally
responsible in a prospective sense of responsibility (based
on a utilitarian notion of deterrence), and if prospective
responsibility also implies retrospective responsibility (in
which case, guilt can be assigned to a moral agent), then
we can reasonably infer that the two ISPs in question
might deserve at least some of the blame in a moral (even
if not in a legal) sense for what happened to Amy Boyer.

5. MORAL OBLIGATION AT THE LEVEL OF
INDIVIDUALS
Let us now take up the question o f individual moral obligation and ask, what responsibilities Internet users have
to inform ~would-be victims" of their immanent danger
to online stalkers? For example, if an Internet user had
been aware of Boyer's situation, should that user have
notified Boyer that she was being stalked? In other words,
should that user be under a moral obligation to do so? If
we want to be responsible, or at least caring citizens, in
cyberspace, the answer would seem to be yes. It would
not be morally permissible to wait for stalking activities
to move into physical space before we took any action.
Various proposals for controlling individual behavior in
online society have resulted in a conflict between those
who wish to regulate by law and those who wish to preserve the practice of sdf-regulation. O f course, this dispute is sometimes also at the base of arguments involving claims having to do with a "safe" social space vs. "restrictive ~ one. In the case of cyberstalking, should our
duty, if we have one, to assist others be based on legal
regulations or should it rest on grounds of individual
moral obligation to assist others?
What exactly is meant by ~moral obligation? ~ Historically, philosophers have offered diverse, and sometimes
competing, definitions of what is meant by this expression. An Internet user consulting a dictiona~ to locate a
colloquial definition would likely discover one similar to
the following: ~[moral obligation is] founded on the fundamental principles of right conduct rather than on legalities enactment or custom" (Random House, 1973).
O f course, philosophers have attempted to give us far
more rigorous definitions of ~moral obligation." An interesting question is whether our notion of moral obliga-

tion is one that is derived from our concept of justice, or
whether instead our sense of ~justice~ derives from moral
obligation. This, obviously, is a complex question and is
one that cannot be satisfactorily discussed and answered
in this paper. O f course, the question o f which moral
notion - obligation or justice - - is more fundamental
could help us to get a dearer sense of exactly what is at
stake in disputes involving individual moral responsibility. Contemporary philosophers and ethicists as diverse
as Josef Peiper (1966), Carol Gilligan (1982), and Anton
Vedder (2001) have explored this question. Unfortunately, in this paper we cannot consider in detail the
various points of view that have been put forth by these
three thinkers. Nonetheless, we will attempt to sketch
out some of the general aspects of their arguments to
support a view of individual moral obligation.
Josef Pieper (1966) has argued that the concept of moral
obligation is one that is not only "personal" but also linked
to one's community. For Peiper, "doing good" is more
than obeying some abstract n o r m (i.e., some Kantian
abstract notion of duty and universality). Rather, it is
about the individual's relationship to other individuals
and to the community itself. Carol Gilligan (1982) first
proposed a position similar to Peiper's in a theory of feminist ethics. Both Pieper and Gilligan suggest that justice
is a complex concept that goes far beyond the notion of
an individual simply obeying laws. Instead, justice involves the relationship of individuals, including their individual moral obligations to one another. In the writings of both Peiper and Gilligan, despite their very different objectives, can be found the basis for the thesis
that individuals are interconnected and that these individual relationships play a primary role in the development of the concept of moral responsibility. The notion
of moral obligation is seen as extending beyond the self
to others, both in Pieper's concept of ~commutative justice" and Gilligan's "ethic of care~. This "ethic of care,"
as it is labeled in feminist ethics, is more than a mere
"non-interference ethic." Rather, it is concerned with
"what is above and beyond the floor of duty"(Held, 1995).
Based on the belief that care and justice are part of the
same moral framework, it has been aargued that individuals have a moral obligation to assist others and to prevent
harm. From this perspective, individuals would be compelled to act from a basis of moral obligation, even though
there may be no specific laws or rules to prescribe such
actions.
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Anton Vedder (2001) has recently put forth a theory of
moral obligation that also has implications at the level of
the individual. From Vedder's view, it would seem to
follow that we cannot excuse ourselves from our moral
responsibility to inform the victim of a threat to his/her
life simply because there is no specific law obligating us
to do so. Vedder asserts that "the sheer ability and opportunity to act in order to avoid or prevent harm, danger, and offense from taking place" puts an obligation on
the agent. We saw in the preceding section how Vedder's
argument can be applied to issues of moral responsibility involving organizations. He also points out that in
cases "when harm, danger or offense would be considerable while the appropriate action would not present significant risks, costs or burdens to the agent," the same
n o t i o n o f moral responsibility applies, regardless o f
whether the agent is a natural person or an organization
(Vedder, 2001).

can be found in Pojman, and to some extent in James
Moor (1998), can be very useful in making the case for
individual moral obligation.

5.1 A Minimalist S e n s e of Moral
Obligation

We can draw an analogy between the Genovese case and
the Boyer case. The world of cyberspace with its attendant anonymity makes it easy for those who wish to avoid
a duty to assist. But, what will cyberspace become, if
people do not take their moral obligations seriously? Is
our obligation merely to do no harm? Pieper, Gilligan
and Vedder would answer no. We can see that balancing
thc h a r m that could come from doing nothing, which
would cause considerable danger to the victim, against
the level of inconvenience caused to self, which would be
minimal, is yet another motivation for Internet users to
assist. In the case of Barber and Ddlapenta, Barber's father with the cooperation of the men who were soliciting
her, provided evidence that led to Ddlapenta's arrest. In
the case of A m y Boyer, however, the sense of individual
moral responsibility was not apparent since certain online
users had indeed viewed the Youens' Web site and did
not inform Amy Boyer that she was being stalked. As in
the case of Kitty Genovese, Boyer was also murdered.
Was Boyer's d e a t h an online m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f the
"Genovese syndrome?"

Some have argued that while morality can demand of an
agent that he or she "do no harm" to others, it cannot
require the agent to actively "prevent harm" or "do good."
In one sense, to do no harm is to act in accordance with
moral obligation. But is doing so always sufficient for
complying with what is required of us as moral agents?
In other words, if it is in our power to prevent harm and
to do good, should we always be required to do so? And,
if the answer to this question is yes, what are the grounds
for such a theory of obligation.
There are a number of theoretical perspectives that would
support the view that individuals should prevent harm
(and otherwise do good) whenever it is in their power to
do so. For example, if one believes, as some natural law
theorists assert, that the purpose of morality is to alleviate human suffering and to promote human flourishing,
whenever possible, then dearly we would seem obligated
to prevent harm in cyberspace. For an interesting account
of this type of moral theory, see Louis Pojman (2001).
Unfortunately, we are not able to develop Pojman's argument here, since doing so would take us beyond the scope
of this paper. But we can at least now see how, based on
a model like Pojman's, one might develop a fuller theory
in which individuals have an obligation to prevent harm
or a "duty to assist." O f course, we recognize the difficulties of defending a natural law theory; and we are not
prepared to do so here. However, we also believe that the
kind of limited or "moderate" natural law theories that
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5.2 E x p a n d i n g the S p h e r e of M o r a l
O b l i g a t i o n : T h e D u t y to A s s i s t
Questions involving one's ~duty to assist" received considerable attention in the notorious Kitty Genovese case
in 1964. Genovese was a young woman who was murdered on her street in Queens, New York, as thirty-eight
of her neighbors watched. T h e y did not call the police
during the 35-minute period of repeated stabbings. This
refusal to assist has since become known as "the Genovese
Syndrome" (Dorman). Police involved in the Genovese
case stated that they believed that even though there was
no formal law or specific statute requiring people who
saw the crime to call the police, these witnesses were
nonetheless morally obligated to do so.

In light of what happened to A m y Boyer, we suggest
that online users adopt a notion of individual responsibility to assist others. D o i n g so would help to keep
cyberspace a safer place for everyone, but especially those
who are particularly vulnerable: w o m e n and children.
O n e might argue that, the threat to Boyer was virtual
J i.e., since the threat was not in physical space, it
need not have been taken seriously. To accept this argum e n t , we w o u l d have to assume that no threats in
cyberspace have ever resulted in harm to or in the death

of the victim. Of course, there have been many cases of the chief investigator in the Amy Boyer cyberstalking
stalking, including the Boyer and Barber cases, as well case, for some helpful information that he provided duras instances of pedophilia, that have resulted in physical ing an interview with him.
harm to individuals. In avoiding our individual duty to
assist, individual users disconnect themselves from their R e f e r e n c e s
responsibility towards fellow human beings. When we
accept the duty to assist, we are acknowledging our moral 1999 Report on cyberstalking: a new challenge fir law enobligation to help prevent others from being harmed.
forcement and industry, www.cybercrime.gov.

CONCLUSION
In this study, we have considered some of the salient
moral issues involving cyberstalking in general, and the
Amy Boyer case in particular. We have seen how, in the
Boyer case, cyberstalking has raised certain kinds of concerns for personal privacy that go beyond earlier privacy
concerns involving the use of computer technology. Because of the kinds of moral concerns raised in the Boyer
case, we considered questions having to do with where
exactly the sphere and the scope of moral responsibility
should lie in cyberstalking incidents in general. We argued that both Interner Service Providers (ISPs) and individual online users should assume moral responsibility, each in different ways. Although we do not purport
to have laid out a definitive answer to the question of
how this should be done, and although we recognize the
difficulties inherent in defending arguments for moral
responsibility at both the organizational and individual
levels, we offer a brief argument for why individuals should
act to prevent harm from coming to others. That is, we
believe that ordinary users have a ~duty to assist~ others
to the extent that they can prevent harm from coming to
their fellow users, wherever (or whenever) it is in their
power to do so.
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